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Abstract
Detecting spoofing attempts of automatic speaker verification
(ASV) systems is challenging, especially when using only one
modelling approach. For robustness, we use both deep neural
networks and traditional machine learning models and combine
them as ensemble models through logistic regression. They are
trained to detect logical access (LA) and physical access (PA)
attacks on the dataset released as part of the ASV Spoofing and
Countermeasures Challenge 2019. We propose dataset parti-
tions that ensure different attack types are present during train-
ing and validation to improve system robustness. Our ensemble
model outperforms all our single models and the baselines from
the challenge for both attack types. We investigate why some
models on the PA dataset strongly outperform others and find
that spoofed recordings in the dataset tend to have longer si-
lences at the end than genuine ones. By removing them, the PA
task becomes much more challenging, with the tandem detec-
tion cost function (t-DCF) of our best single model rising from
0.1672 to 0.5018 and equal error rate (EER) increasing from
5.98% to 19.8% on the development set.
Index Terms: ASVspoof 2019, logical access attack, physical
access attack, countermeasures, anti-spoofing, model ensemble.
1. Introduction
An automatic speaker verification (ASV) [1] system aims at ver-
ifying the claimed identity of a speaker and is widely used for
person authentication. Though the technology has matured im-
mensely over the past few years, studies [2, 3] have confirmed
its vulnerability in the face of spoofing, also known as a presen-
tation attack [4]. Mimicry [5], replay [6], text-to-speech (TTS)
[3] and voice-conversion (VC) [2] technology are commonly
used to perform logical access (LA) or physical access (PA)
spoofing attacks in ASV systems [7]. While LA attacks (TTS
and VC) are mounted by injecting synthetic/converted speech
directly into the ASV pipeline bypassing its microphone, PA
attacks (replay and mimicry), on the contrary, involve physical
transmission of impersonated or playback speech through the
systems’ microphone.
Spoofing countermeasures for reliable speaker verification
are therefore of paramount interest. To this end, the ASV com-
munity has released standard spoofing datasets [8, 9, 7] as part
of the automatic speaker verification spoofing and countermea-
sures challenges (ASVspoof), promoting research in this direc-
tion. The ASVspoof 2019 challenge [10, 7] combines both LA
and PA (excluding mimicry) attacks using the latest state-of-
the-art TTS and VC methods and controlled-simulation setup
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for replay attacks, in contrast to the 2015 and 2017 spoofing
datasets.
Designing a single model to robustly detect unseen spoofing
attacks can be challenging, as demonstrated at the ASVspoof
2015 and 2017 challenges, where the best performing systems
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] made use of an ensemble model com-
bining features or scores. In this paper, we investigate LA and
PA spoofing detection on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset using en-
semble models. Below we summarise our contributions.
• We build our models by discarding data points (Sec-
tion 2) ensuring non-overlap in spoofing conditions be-
tween training and validation for better generalisation.
• We demonstrate that combining information from deep
and traditional machine learning approaches along with
our dataset partition can improve model generalisation.
• We find that spoofed audio recordings for the PA task
tend to have more silence at the end than bonafide
recordings. We perform three different interventions
proving that models exploit this fault in the dataset and
achieve lower performance without these cues.
• We make our dataset partition details and silence re-
moval scripts available online1.
Our results suggest that performance metrics reported on
the current PA dataset may be overestimating the actual per-
formance of the models, which might become somewhat of a
“horse” [17] that trivially sidesteps the actual problem, thus
raising concerns about model validity as well as performance
results. Prior work has addressed a similar issue of silence on
the ASVspoof 2017 PA dataset [18], which calls for careful de-
sign and validation of the 2019 PA spoofing dataset2.
2. Task description and dataset
Given a speech recording the task is to build a spoofing coun-
termeasure, a model, to automatically determine whether it is
a bonafide (genuine) or spoofed, either generated through TTS,
VC or a replayed recording.
The ASVspoof 2019 LA and PA datasets were released as
part of this year’s challenge [10]. Both consist of 8 male and
12 female speakers in the training and development subsets. In
LA, there are 2, 580 bonafide and 22, 800 spoofed utterances
in the training set and 2, 548 bonafide and 22, 296 spoofed ut-
terances in the development set. In PA, both the training and
development sets has 5, 400 bonafide utterances, and 48, 600
and 24, 300 spoofed utterances in the training and development
sets, respectively. The evaluation set has around 80, 000 and
135, 000 test utterances in the LA and PA datasets [7, 10].
1https://github.com/BhusanChettri/ASVspoof2019/
2We have reported the “silence” issue to the challenge organisers.
The training and development subsets have similar spoofing
algorithms/conditions in both the LA and PA datasets. We argue
that using the same types of spoofing attacks during training and
validation might lead to overfitting and poor generalisation on
unseen attack conditions. Thus, we further partition the original
training and development datasets for both LA and PA, ensur-
ing non-overlap in spoofing attack conditions. We use a subset
train tr of the training set for model training and take a sub-
set of the development (dev) set and partition it into dev es for
model validation and early stopping and dev lr to build model
ensembles through logistic regression. Although taking these
subsets requires discarding many samples, it allows us to test
how well a model generalises to previously unseen attack con-
ditions: The spoofing attack conditions and speakers in train tr
and dev es are non-overlapping. In dev lr, we use all spoofing
conditions of the dev set but discard speakers that have been
used in dev es.
3. Models in the Proposed Ensembles
In this section, we describe the approach used to design coun-
termeasures for the LA and PA tasks of the ASVspoof 2019
challenge. A model ensemble is used in order to combine infor-
mation from different countermeasure models employing vari-
ous features and training procedures. This diversity leads to a
powerful ensemble with good generalisation.
3.1. Deep models
We train five deep models using raw audio or time-
frequency representations as input to minimise a binary cross-
entropy (CE) loss with an Adam optimiser and early stopping
with a patience of P epochs. As the dataset has more spoofed
examples, we replicate the bonafide examples to ensure each
batch contains an equal number of bonafide and spoofed exam-
ples, which helps stabilise the training. At inference time, we
use the output layer sigmoid activation as a score. We provide
model-specific training details below.
3.1.1. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
We use the CNN architecture from [19], featuring 50% dropout
in the fully connected layers, a batch size of 32, and a learning
rate of 10−4. We train the model for 100 epochs with an early
stopping patience of P = 5 and P = 2 for the LA and PA tasks,
respectively. We use an utterance-level mean-variance normal-
ized log spectrogram3, computed using a 1024-point FFT with
a hop size of 160 samples, as the input. For each task, we train
two such CNN models, model A and B, on the first and last 4
seconds of each audio sample. We truncate or loop the spectro-
gram time frames to obtain a unified time representation.
3.1.2. Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network (CRNN)
We use a modified version of the CRNN architecture from our
prior work [20] (model C). We train the model for 500 epochs
with early stopping patience of P = 10 for both the LA and PA
tasks. As input, we use a mean-variance (computed on train tr
set) normalized log-Mel spectrogram of 40 Mel bands, com-
puted on the first 5 seconds of truncated or looped audio sam-
ples, using a 1024-point FFT with a hop size of 256 samples.
During training, we use a batch size of 8 and 32 for the LA and
PA tasks, respectively, with an initial learning rate of 10−5 that
3Power-spectrogram for the LA task and Mel-spectrogram with 80
mel bands (for computational reasons) for the PA task.
is halved on validation loss plateau with a patience of P = 5
epochs, until 10−8.
3.1.3. 1D-Convolutional Neural Network
We use the network architecture from the sample-level 1D CNN
[21] (model D). In total, the model consists of 9 ReSE-2 blocks
[22]. These blocks are a combination of ResNets [23] and
SENets [24]. We use the multi-level feature aggregation, where
the outputs of the last three blocks are concatenated and fol-
lowed by a fully connected layer of 1024 units, batch normal-
ization and ReLU layers, a 50% dropout layer and a fully con-
nected layer of 1 unit with sigmoid activation. Each convolu-
tional layer has filters of size 3, L2 weight regularizer of 0.0005
and all strides are of unit value. The raw audio input is 3.7 sec-
onds in duration and randomly sampled segments of this size
are selected from the recordings. We loop shorter samples to
obtain a unified time representation. We train the model using
a batch size of 16, learning rate of 10−4 and an early stopping
patience of P = 25 epochs.
3.1.4. Wave-U-Net
We use a modified version of the Wave-U-Net [25], with five
layers of stride four, and without upsampling blocks (model
E). The outputs of the last convolution are max-pooled across
time, reducing the parameter count and incorporating the in-
tuition that the important features in the tasks are temporally
local. Finally, we apply a fully connected layer with a single
output to yield a classification probability. We train the model
using a batch size of 64, a learning rate of 10−5 and early
stopping patience of P = 10 for both the LA and PA tasks,
where an epoch is defined as 500 update steps. To ensure the
audio inputs have the same length, we pad all recordings with
silence to 196608 audio samples (= 12.23 seconds). For the
PA task, we also match real samples to their spoofed versions
based on the speaker identity and utterance. We train on pairs
of audio samples (discarding samples without any matches) and
balanced batches, in order to stabilise the training process and
improve generalisation by preventing the network from using
speaker identity and utterance content for discrimination.
3.2. Shallow models
Additional to deep models, we use two different shallow [26]
models: Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) and Support Vector
Machines (SVMs).
3.2.1. GMM
We train three GMM models using 60-dimensional static, delta
and acceleration (SDA) mel frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs) [27] (model F), inverted mel frequency cepstral coef-
ficients (IMFCCs) [28] (model G), and sub-band centroid mag-
nitude coefficients (SCMC) [29] (model H), due to their per-
formance on the ASVspoof 2015 and 2017 spoofing datasets
[30, 18]. We use 128 and 256 mixture components for the
LA and PA tasks respectively and train one GMM each for
bonafide and spoof class. At test time, the score of each test ut-
terance is obtained as the average log-likelihood ratio between
the bonafide and spoof GMMs. We use the feature configuration
from [30].
3.2.2. SVM
We train two SVMs using i-vectors (model I) and the long-
term-average-spectrum (LTAS) feature (model J) since they
have shown good performance on prior spoofing datasets [30,
31, 32]. Inspired from [12] we fuse multiple i-vectors in our
approach, each based on complimentary hand-engineered fea-
tures, and manage to improve performance over a single i-vector
based SVM. We train four different i-vector extractors using 60-
dimensional SDA MFCC, IMFCC, constant Q cepstral coeffi-
cients (CQCC) [33] and SCMC features. We train the T matrix
with 100 total factors on both tasks and universal background
model (UBM) with 128 and 256 mixtures on the LA and PA
tasks, respectively and extract 4 different 100-dimensional i-
vectors for every utterance. We use 400-dimensional fused i-
vectors for LA and 300 for PA task. We perform mean-variance
normalisation on the fused i-vectors and LTAS feature and train
SVMs with a linear kernel and the default parameters of the
Scikit-Learn [34] library. We train the UBM and T matrix using
the MSR-Identity toolkit [35].
3.3. Ensemble models
We define three ensemble models E1, E2 and E3 using the lo-
gistic regression implementation of the Bosaris [36] toolkit. On
the LA task, E1 combines models A, C through G and I, while
E2 consists of A, B and G. On the PA task, E1 fuses all single
models except D, and E2 combines models A through E. Fi-
nally, E3 combines models A and B on both LA and PA tasks.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental setup
We train our models (single and ensemble) described in Sec-
tion 3 using the train tr and dev lr sets respectively. We use
dev es for model validation, early stopping and hyper-parameter
optimisation. We compare our models’ performance with the
baseline LFCC (model B1) and CQCC (model B2) feature
based GMM models provided by the ASVspoof 2019 challenge
organisers.
We evaluate our models using the minimum normalized
tandem detection cost function (t-DCF) [37] metric, that takes
both the ASV system and spoofing countermeasure errors into
consideration, and is used as the primary evaluation metric in
the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. We also evaluate our model per-
formance independently with the equal error rate (EER) metric.
Please refer [7, 37] for details.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Development set
Table 1 presents the results on the original development set for
both LA and PA tasks. In general, the results suggest that PA
task is harder than LA. For the PA task, our CNN performs no-
ticeably better when operating on the last 4 seconds of audio
(model B) instead of the first 4 seconds (model A), suggesting
the presence of discriminative cues at the end of each audio sig-
nal which we confirm in Section 5. Furthermore, we observe
a poor performance for models D and E. Apart from having
to learn features directly from the raw audio, another reason
could be that they involve zero-padding all signals or using a
randomly selected audio segment for prediction, respectively,
and thus might not be able to exploit such cues at the end of
audio signals.
Table 1: Results on the LA and PA development set. Bold: best
performance, na: not applicable.
Model LA PAt-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
B1 0.0663 2.71 0.2554 11.96
B2 0.0123 0.43 0.1953 9.87
A 0.0074 0.32 0.2795 10.77
B 0.0040 0.27 0.1672 5.98
C 0.1706 5.65 0.1223 5.0
D 0.36 13.58 0.9269 36.28
E 0.0745 2.43 0.4725 21.16
F 0.1805 7.46 0.2354 10.88
G 0.0438 1.73 0.2119 8.94
H na na 0.2787 12.46
I 0.0045 0.16 0.2537 9.93
J na na 0.3534 13.6
E1 0.0 0.0 0.0354 1.33
E2 0.0002 0.03 0.0523 1.85
E3 0.0025 0.2 0.1316 4.85
Table 2: Results on the LA and PA evaluation set. Bold, na:
same as in Table 1.
Model LA PAt-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
B1 0.2116 8.09 0.3017 13.54
B2 0.2366 9.57 0.2454 11.04
A 0.1790 7.66 na na
B na na 0.1577 5.75
E1 0.0755 2.64 0.1492 6.11
E2 0.2136 9.57 0.2913 14.12
E3 0.2952 10.63 0.1465 5.43
Our i-vector feature fusion approach (model I) shows im-
pressive performance on the LA task but relatively poor perfor-
mance on the PA task. One reason for this could be that the i-
vectors extracted using hand-crafted features are not able to cap-
ture characteristics of unseen replay attack conditions. On both
the LA and PA tasks, model G (IMFCC) outperforms model F
(MFCC), suggesting that a focus on higher frequency informa-
tion is beneficial as it might not be perfectly generated by the
TTS and VC algorithms. Likewise, on the PA task, the playback
device properties may impact high-frequency content. Finally,
the poor performance of models H and J suggest that SCMC
and LTAS features are not suitable for this task.
As expected, our ensemble model appears to benefit from
combining different models for both tasks, as indicated by the
strong reduction in t-DCF and EER compared to all individual
models. On both tasks, E1 performs better than E2 which in
turn performs better than E3.
4.2.2. Evaluation set
Table 2 shows the results on the evaluation set4. On the LA
task, model E1 has an EER of 2.64% and a t-DCF of 0.0755,
outperforming the baselines by a large margin and securing the
third rank in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. The superior per-
formance of E1 over E2 and E3 suggests that fusing multiple
4Computed by the ASVspoof 2019 challenge organisers.
Table 3: Intervention (Int) results on the development set of PA
tasks. Numbers to the left of arrow indicates performance with-
out any intervention.
Int Model t-DCF EER%
I
M1 0.2036→ 0.2741 9.18→ 13.27
M2 0.1971→ 0.2959 10.06→ 15.59
B 0.1672→ 0.5018 5.98→ 19.8
II
M1 0.2036→ 0.9528 9.18→ 54.76
M2 0.1971→ 0.9463 10.06→ 57.98
B 0.1672→ 0.2626 5.98→ 11.20
III
M1 0.2036→ 0.8614 9.18→ 41.09
M2 0.1971→ 0.9448 10.06→ 58.71
B 0.1672→ 0.3129 5.98→ 12.85
models employing different features does provide complemen-
tary information useful for spoofing detection.
However, on the PA tasks our single model B outperforms
ensemble models E1 (on the EER) and E2 (both metrics). Fur-
thermore, our two model ensemble E2 (A+B) outperforms the
five deep model ensemble E2 and nine model ensemble E1
reaching the lowest t-DCF of 0.1465 and an EER of 5.43%.
While these results suggest good model generalisation, it raises
questions about the relevance of the cues used by model B as it
is only trained on the last 4 seconds of each recording. Besides
the poor performance of models D and E, the inferior perfor-
mance of ensemble models on the evaluation set compared to
the development set (Table 1) could be explained by model C
making random predictions on the evaluation data (due to a bug
we found after the challenge submission), but not on the de-
velopment set – which is corroborated by the fact that model
C receives the second highest weight by logistic regression in
both E1 and E2.
5. Interventions on the PA task
In Table 1 we find that for the PA task, the same CNN performs
much better when trained on the last 4 seconds of audio (model
B) than on the first 4 seconds (model A). We thus analyse a set
of audio recordings for the PA task that were confidently classi-
fied by model B and find that spoofed audio tend to have more
silence (zero-valued samples) at the end than bonafide exam-
ples. In comparison, silence at the beginning of the recordings is
often shorter and does not appear to follow this pattern. There-
fore, we hypothesize that any model (deep or shallow) trained
on the PA dataset that does not specifically discard this infor-
mation could exploit the duration of silence as a discriminative
cue. This leads to countermeasure models that are easily manip-
ulated, simply by removing silence from the spoofed signals to
make the model misclassify them as a bonafide signal, and vice
versa. To demonstrate this effect in practice, we perform three
interventions on model B and the adapted5 baselines M1 and
M2 by manipulating the silence at the end of the audio signal.
5.1. Intervention I
In this intervention we train the models on the original record-
ings with the silence but remove them during testing6. In Ta-
5We use 128 mixtures to train the LFCC (M1) and CQCC (M2)
GMMs in contrast to 512 mixtures used in the baselines B1 and B2.
6We use a naive approach of counting the first consecutive zeros as
silence and remove them.
ble 3, a strong increase can be noticed in both EER and t-DCF
for all models, suggesting that they indeed rely on the silence
parts for prediction. We find that model B is most sensitive to
this intervention, with t-DCF and EER rising by 0.3346 and an
absolute 13.82%, respectively. This could be due to deep mod-
els focusing more strongly on silences than the GMM models,
which are trained on individual spectral frames and aggregate
the score through averaging frame-wise likelihoods.
5.2. Intervention II
Here, we train the model with silence parts removed, but test
on the original test recordings (with silence). The stable per-
formance of the CNN (model B) over the GMMs in Table 3
suggests that the former is more robust against variations in si-
lence duration. On the other hand, we find a dramatic increase
in error rates for M1 and M2. One interpretation for this is that
bonafide and spoof GMM may assign a low likelihood to si-
lence frames as they have not seen them during training. Thus,
silence frames do not make large contributions to the final score
making the task much harder.
5.3. Intervention III
In this intervention, we remove silence during training and test-
ing to ensure that the audio samples do not share an easily ex-
ploitable cue. This forces the models to learn about the actually
relevant factors of interest and thus provides more realistic per-
formance estimates (Table 3). As in intervention II, model B
shows a stable performance indicating good generalisation and
discrimination capabilities. Models M1 and M2 on the other
hand achieve a poor performance, possibly since their bonafide
GMM models assign a high likelihood to spoofed frames as
they are very similar to bonafide ones when only considering
the speech frames.
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we approach the logical access (TTS and VC)
and physical access (replay) spoofing detection problem on the
ASVspoof 2019 dataset using ensemble models, demonstrating
that combining models trained on different feature representa-
tions can be effective in detecting unseen spoofing attacks. We
achieve good performance on the PA and 3rd ranking on the
LA tasks of the challenge. The PA task seems generally more
difficult and should thus be the primary focus of future work.
Our intervention experiments in Section 5 suggests that
many models trained on the PA dataset can become somewhat
of a “horse”, where solving the actual problem is unintention-
ally avoided by exploiting silence as trivial cues. As the evalua-
tion set also contains such silences, the reported performance
metrics in this task currently overestimate the actual perfor-
mance. In addition to removing silence from the end of record-
ings, we also removed it from the beginning, but found that it
has much less impact on performance and therefore do not re-
port the results in this paper. However, due to our simple ap-
proach at silence removal, near-silent segments and silences be-
tween words within the recording might remain and could also
serve as an undesirable discriminative cue and so should be in-
vestigated in future work.
We aim to perform further analysis on our deep models
once the test set labels are released to the public, including the
impact of the faulty deep model that produced random predic-
tions on the evaluation set.
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